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V ariations in acquiescence and extremity pose substantial threats to the validity of cross-cultural research that relieson survey methods. Individual and cultural correlates of response styles when using 2 contrasting types of response
mode were investigated, drawing on data from 55 cultural groups across 33 nations. Using 7 dimensions of self-other
relatedness that have often been confounded within the broader distinction between independence and interdependence,
our analysis yields more specific understandings of both individual- and culture-level variations in response style. When
using a Likert-scale response format, acquiescence is strongest among individuals seeing themselves as similar to others,
and where cultural models of selfhood favour harmony, similarity with others and receptiveness to influence. However,
when using Schwartz’s (2007) portrait-comparison response procedure, acquiescence is strongest among individuals
seeing themselves as self-reliant but also connected to others, and where cultural models of selfhood favour self-reliance
and self-consistency. Extreme responding varies less between the two types of response modes, and is most prevalent
among individuals seeing themselves as self-reliant, and in cultures favouring self-reliance. As both types of response
mode elicit distinctive styles of response, it remains important to estimate and control for style effects to ensure valid
comparisons.
Keywords: Response style; Culture; Self-construal.
Across a broad range of practical issues, accurate inter-
pretation of mean differences in values, attitudes and
opinions obtained from surveys is crucial to testing
of theories as well as effective practical interventions.
We therefore need a clear understanding of the ways
in which survey responses may be affected by extra-
neous factors. This issue is particularly critical when
comparing responses from cultural groups that differ
in habitual communication styles. Given a set of items
keyed to Likert-type scales, respondents from particular
groups may distinctively favour agreeing with items
(acquiescence), favour extreme points (extremity) or
favour midpoints (moderation). That research partici-
pants respond to survey items based on question format
in addition to specific item content has long been recog-
nised, and the threat posed by such effects to the validity
of cross-cultural measurement has been studied exten-
sively (Johnson, Shavitt, & Holbrook, 2011). However,
we do not yet know the relative contribution of type of
cultures sampled, type of respondent self-construal and
particular response format to response style effects. If we
can estimate these contributory factors, we will be better
able to determine how best to design measures and how
to control for response style effects.
Single-nation studies of acquiescence have indicated
that scores may vary due to item complexity (Condon,
Ferrando, & Demestre, 2006) and in relation to variations
in item content (Hinz, Michalski, Schwarz, & Herzberg,
2007). However, the results of Smith (2004) suggest
that variation in acquiescence between nations is also
substantial and important. He reported that cross-national
differences in acquiescence derived from different
studies correlated at between .5 and .7, even though
studies had used different items and different samples.
Cross-cultural research into response style has mostly
focused on two issues: how best to explain nation-level
variations, and whether such effects should be considered
measurement artefacts or valid indicators of specific
population attributes. We contribute to these debates by
(a) conducting a finer-grained examination than pre-
vious studies into the combined roles of cultural
differences and corresponding individual differences
in self-construal as predictors of both acquiescent and
extreme response styles and (b) examining the extent
to which these variations depend on the response scale
employed. Our position is that response style will vary
between samples no matter what type of measurement is
employed—hence, for cross-cultural studies to approach
valid measurement, effects of response style must be esti-
mated. Whether these effects should also be discounted
depends on the constructs being examined.
Culture and response style
Existing characterisations of cross-national differences
have been strongly guided by the results of large-scale sur-
vey data. What we know therefore depends on the degree
to which response styles have been adequately controlled.
Smith (2004) computed estimates of nation-level acqui-
escence from seven previously published cross-national
surveys, each sampling 34 or more nations. These surveys
had employed Likert-type response categories, and none
included reverse-coded items. Acquiescence was defined
by summing item means across conceptually unrelated
items. Substantial correlations were found between six of
the seven acquiescence estimates, the exception being that
derived from ratings of the behaviours of “others in my
society” sampled by House et al. (2004). This does not
mean that acquiescence was absent from the House et al.
data, but if present, it was evidently shaped by different
factors. Smith then used cultural dimension scores pro-
vided by House et al. to predict acquiescence within the
other data sets. Acquiescence was greater in samples with
more collectivistic behaviours and with values favouring
uncertainty avoidance.
Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, and Shavitt (2005) analysed
extreme responding across 19 nations and acquiescence
across 10 nations. Extremity was coded as the frequency
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of using scale endpoints. Acquiescence was coded as the
frequency with which respondents agreed or tended to
agree with both items in a series of paired positively and
negatively worded items that had similar content. After
controlling for individual-level effects, acquiescence was
significantly predicted by low GNP and by each of
Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions, namely collec-
tivism, femininity, low uncertainty avoidance and low
power distance. These results differ in some respects from
those of Smith (2004), perhaps because of the smaller
number of nations sampled. Moreover, neither study
included individual-level measures of cultural orientation.
Studies were thus needed to assess effects at both
individual and national levels. Smith and Fischer (2008)
reported a multi-level analysis of extremity and acqui-
escence using survey data from business managers
in 38 nations (Smith, Peterson, & Schwartz, 2002).
Their data included a three-item measure of indepen-
dent/interdependent self-construal. At the individual
level, acquiescence was predicted by interdependence,
whereas extremity was predicted by independence. At the
nation level, acquiescence was stronger in collectivistic
cultures and extremity was stronger in more individu-
alistic cultures. Moreover, cross-level interactions were
found. Acquiescence was particularly strong among
individuals with interdependent self-construal within
collectivistic cultures. Extremity was particularly strong
among individuals with independent self-construals
within individualistic cultures.
Subsequent studies using large-scale cross-national
survey data continue to identify nation-level collectivism
as a strong predictor of acquiescent responding (He, van
de Vijver, Dominguez Espinosa, & Mui, 2014; Smith,
2011). These studies also show that response styles are
associated with a cultural dimension termed monumen-
talism versus flexumility (Minkov, 2011). Minkov defines
monumentalism as “a cultural syndrome that stands for
pride and an invariant self: A conviction that one must
have an invariant identity and hold onto some invariant
beliefs and norms. It also reflects an avoidance of personal
duality and inconsistency” (p. 129). Both acquiescence
and extremity are greater in monumentalist cultures.
The studies reviewed provide indications of the cul-
tural contexts that elicit most acquiescence in response
to Likert-scale items. However, the concept of collec-
tivism is broad and ill-defined, and we need more spe-
cific understandings to better understand its linkage with
response style. Here, we unpackage the previously found
nation-level effects of collectivism and monumentalism
by distinguishing five dimensions of self-other related-
ness that are distinctively linked to collectivism or to
monumentalism, and estimating their effects on acquies-
cent and extreme responding at both individual and cul-
tural levels of analysis. Additionally, we explore possible
effects of two further dimensions of self-other relatedness
that are not linked empirically to either collectivism or
monumentalism.
Taking account of response style
Cross-cultural researchers have employed four prin-
cipal ways of taking account of response style:
inclusion of reverse-scored items (Owe et al., 2013),
within-respondent standardisation (Hofstede, 2001;
Schwartz, 2007), use of response categories other
than Likert-type scales (Schwartz, 2007) and adjust-
ing scores by identifying a latent acquiescence factor
(Welkenhuysen-Gybels, Billiet, & Cambré, 2003). In
other major projects such as the World Values Survey
(Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, & Welzel, 2008), response
style variations are not modelled, implicitly assuming
that acquiescence is a component of the values and
behaviours under study. Here, we test whether different
effects are found when responding to Likert-scale items,
and when using items keyed with Schwartz’s (2007)
alternative response format, which involves comparing
verbal portraits of others with oneself. Our concern is
not with comparing the magnitude of each response
style across items, since this may well vary with item
content; we focus instead on the personal and cultural
circumstances that maximise distinctive response styles
within a given set of items and response scales.
Self-construals and cultural models of selfhood
To extend earlier findings, predictors are required that tap
individual and cultural aspects of the contrast between
individualism and collectivism. Measures of indepen-
dent and interdependent self-construal are suitable for
this purpose. However, the most widely used mea-
sures (e.g., Singelis, 1994) lack adequate reliability and
validity, partly owing to a lack of control for acquies-
cence. Recently, Vignoles et al. (in press) developed
and validated a measure tapping seven dimensions of
self-construal in a study including 55 cultural groups
across 33 nations. In contrast to many cross-cultural stud-
ies, Vignoles et al. (in press) obtained data from several
different cultural groups within many of the sampled
nations. In this paper, we adopt cultural groups, rather
than nations, as higher-level units of analysis.
Vignoles et al.’s (in press) measure includes forward
and reverse-scored items tapping each of their seven
dimensions, allowing them to model a response-style
method factor. In multi-level measurement models, their
seven-factor solution showed configural invariance across
individual and cultural levels, allowing them to char-
acterise individuals’ self-construals and cultural groups’
models of selfhood using the same seven dimensions.
Furthermore, the seven dimensions could not be reduced
to a second-order contrast between independence and
interdependence at either level. The seven factors should
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therefore be considered as separate constructs at both
individual and cultural levels, and can be used to predict
the response style profiles that will be found in relation to
differing response formats.
Only four of the dimensions identified by Vignoles
et al. (in press) were associated with culture-level col-
lectivism: difference (vs. similarity), self-direction (vs.
dependence on others), self-expression (vs. harmony)
and self-containment (vs. connectedness to others). Their
data also indicates that a fifth dimension, consistency
(vs. variability), was associated with monumentalism (vs.
flexumility). Two further dimensions, self-reliance (vs.
dependence on others) and self-interest (vs. commitment
to others) were not related to either collectivism or
monumentalism.
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
We now consider how positions of individuals and cul-
tural groups on these dimensions may predict levels of
acquiescence and extremity, starting with the frequently
employed Likert-type “agree/disagree” format.
Collectivism
Hofstede (2001) emphasised that individualism–
collectivism is about independence from or dependence
on group membership. In contrast, his dimension of
masculinity–femininity “… is about ego-enhancement
versus relationship enhancement, regardless of group
ties” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 293). This defines collectivism
as entailing long-term inclusion in groups, rather than
particular aspects of group dynamics. However, later
authors have understood collectivism as including, for
example, preference for preserving harmony and being
receptive to influence from relevant others (Smith, Fis-
cher, Vignoles, & Bond, 2013). Each of these attributes
may be distinctive of particular collectivistic cultures, but
there is no reason to expect they are necessarily strongly
associated with one another. We therefore consider in turn
possible understandings of the effect of collectivism on
response styles, involving each of the four dimensions of
self-other relatedness that showed predicted associations
with collectivism in Vignoles et al. (in press).
Firstly, cultural differences in response style may be
a matter of communication style (Smith, 2004, 2011).
People in collectivist cultures are more likely to curtail
self-expression to safeguard harmony within their groups
(i.e., self-expression vs. harmony). Disagreeing with
others or expressing extreme opinions would both risk
disturbing harmony. Consequently, individuals focused
on harmony rather than self-expression may prefer
the “safer” option of expressing agreement with the
statements in a questionnaire, and adopting less extreme
positions in their responses.
Secondly, effects of collectivism on response styles
may involve social influence. Members of individualist
cultures are more likely to make their own decisions
(self-direction), whereas members of collectivist cultures
are more likely to be influenced by others (receptivity
to influence), as shown by cross-national comparisons
of conformity (Bond & Smith, 1996). Those who are
more receptive to influence may be more swayed by the
opinions expressed in questionnaire items and so agree
with them more (i.e., higher acquiescence). It is less
clear whether self-direction versus receptivity to influence
could be expected to predict extreme responding.
Thirdly, effects of collectivism may derive from
self-other differentiation. Two of the self-construal
dimensions tap this issue, but in slightly different ways:
Difference versus similarity reflects a desire to be
different or similar to others: one could assert one’s
difference by disagreeing with the presented items, or
by taking up extreme positions. Self-containment versus
connectedness concerns the clarity or permeability of
self-other boundaries. Those perceiving a very clear
boundary between self and others might have less dif-
ficulty expressing their opinions clearly, whereas those
perceiving a fuzzy boundary might give less extreme
responses due to uncertainty about their own (diffuse)
position in relation to items.
For each of these possibilities, a related issue is how
far effects are attributable to individuals’ personal cul-
tural orientations (i.e., their self-construals) or to the
culture-level normative environment (i.e., cultural mod-
els of selfhood). For each prediction, we test both levels
simultaneously. The possibilities outlined above comprise
alternative ways of understanding linkages of cultural col-
lectivism with response style. Thus, although we number
them here as one hypothesis, referring to acquiescence
and one referring to extremity, the proposed elements
within each hypothesis are independent of one another:
H1. Acquiescent responding on Likert-type scales will be
greater where persons or cultural groups score higher on
(a) harmony with others, (b) receptiveness to influence,
(c) similarity with others and (d) connectedness with
others.
Conversely:
H2. Extreme responding on Likert-type scales will be
higher where persons or cultural groups score higher on
(a) self-expression, (b) self-direction, (c) difference from
others and (d) self-containment.
Monumentalism
Monumentalism has been shown to predict both high
acquiescence and high extremity (He et al., 2014;
Smith, 2011). In both studies, monumentalism was more
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strongly correlated with extremity than with acquies-
cence. Models of selfhood in monumentalist cultures
are characterised by high self-consistency. It is plausible
that self-consistency and extremity would be associated,
given that cultures of monumentalism favour religious
commitment and certainty regarding the merits of one’s
nation: Participants concerned about self-consistency
would want to give answers that maximally
reflect their existing views, rather than moderating
them.
H3. Extreme responding on Likert-type scales will be
greater where persons or cultural groups score higher on
self-consistency.
It is harder to see theoretically why self-consistency
would predict higher acquiescence, and we suspect that
the previously observed relations between monumental-
ism and acquiescence may be due to aspects of mon-
umentalism not captured by Vignoles et al. (in press)
dimensions of selfhood (which were not designed to cap-
ture monumentalism).
We also explored associations of response styles with
the remaining two aspects of self-construal identified by
Vignoles et al. (in press), namely self-interest versus com-
mitment to others and self-reliance versus dependence
others, but made no specific predictions.
Response mode
Cross-cultural researchers have sought to control for
or eliminate effects of response style. In particular,
Schwartz (2007) asked respondents to rate how similar
to themselves are persons exemplifying specific values.
By providing a set of specific comparators, he sought
to overcome some ambiguities of responding to items
with Likert-type scales (e.g., Heine, Lehman, Peng, &
Greenholz, 2002).
Schwartz’s (2007) portrait-comparison format requires
respondents to reflect about themselves and about oth-
ers. Some of the arguments presented above in relation
to collectivism can be expected to apply also to the “like
me/unlikeme” format. Respondents who favour harmony,
similarity and connectedness with others, and are recep-
tive to influence, are more likely to see other persons as
similar to themselves:
H4. Acquiescent responding on portrait-comparison
response scales will be greater where persons or cul-
tural groups score higher on (a) harmony with others,
(b) receptiveness to influence, (c) similarity with others
and (d) connectedness with others.
However, making judgements using the
portrait-comparison format may be easier in more
individualistic cultures, where persons’ actions are taken
as representative of internal states. In more collectivist
cultures, actions are more frequently seen as responding
to contextual requirements (Smith et al., 2013), and
respondents are less likely to describe themselves as
consistent across settings (e.g., Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi,
Lee, & Katsura, 2004). Church et al. (2012) investigated
beliefs in traitedness in Mexico, the Philippines, Japan
and the United States; traitedness beliefs negatively
predicted the need to monitor one’s behaviours in relation
to others. Where traitedness is high, the similarity or
difference between oneself and various types of others
will be more apparent, enabling respondents to make
more definite judgements about each of the survey items.
Conversely, where traitedness is low, less extreme judge-
ments would be likely: “I am sometimes like this person,
and sometimes not.” Traitedness is most clearly exempli-
fied by self-construals of oneself as different from others,
self-reliant and consistent in one’s behaviour. Thus:
H5. Extreme responding on portrait-comparison response
scales will be greater where persons or cultural
groups score higher on (a) difference from others, (b)
self-consistency and (c) self-reliance.
We note that in relation to self-consistency, our reason-
ing led us to converging predictions for Likert scales (H3)
and for portrait-comparison scales (H5b).
METHOD
Data were collected by (Owe et al., 2013) and Vignoles
et al. (in press), who provide fuller details of the devel-
opment of their self-construal measure. Selection of
the dependent measures used in this secondary analy-
sis was constrained by those employed in the original
study. However, it was desirable to select a broad
range of items with conventional Likert-type response
scales. It was also important to sample Schwartz’s
(2007) portrait-comparison format, since this is explic-
itly intended to overcome problems associated with
Likert-scale format.
Participants and Procedure
Opportunity samples of adults were accessed by snow-
balling from researchers’ social networks, through com-
munity groups and non-governmental organisations, and
by university students collecting data from their relatives.
The sample comprised 7122 adults from 55 different cul-
tural groups. Cultural groups drawn from within each
nation were defined on the basis of demographic crite-
ria such as region, ethnicity, religion and status that were
judged to be most salient by locally based co-authors of
this paper. This procedure was adopted to provide more
adequate representation of cultural diversity than that
© 2016 International Union of Psychological Science
458 SMITH ET AL.
provided by simple comparison of nations. Full demo-
graphic details are provided in the Appendix.
Measures
Self-construals/cultural models of selfhood
Vignoles et al. (in press) included 38 self-construal
items in their survey. Some items were adapted from
earlier measures (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singe-
lis, 1994) and others were newly drafted. Wordings
were intended to improve clarity and concreteness and
to account for acquiescence using reverse-coded items
that did not include negative statements. The present
study uses data for the 22 items found by Vignoles
et al. to best represent their seven dimensions across
cultures.
To make the task of responding as specific as possible,
participants were asked: “How well does each of these
statements describe you.” To reduce possible reference
group effects (Heine et al., 2002) and encourage idio-
graphic comparisons, participants were asked to think
about the items in relation to each other, rather than
comparing themselves with other persons within their
cultural context. Nine-point response scales were used,
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (exactly), with three
intermediate anchor-points (3= a little, 5=moderately,
7= very well). Items were worded using “you,” in order
to make the task feel less introspective and to make
it more natural where semi-literate participants were
helped to read the questions by research assistants.
Example items are “You like being different from other
people” (difference), and “You always ask your family
for advice before making a decision” (receptiveness to
influence).
Vignoles et al. (in press) tested multi-level measure-
ment models, decomposing variance in these items into
individual and cultural levels of analysis and finding sup-
port for seven bipolar factors, as well as a separate method
factor modelling acquiescence (Welkenhuysen-Gybels
et al., 2003), at both individual and cultural levels of anal-
ysis. To reflect the decomposition of variance and differ-
ences in factor structure across levels, and to adjust for the
method factor, our analyses used factor scores saved from
this model.
Likert-type response styles
Three measures in our survey used six-point response
scales from 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (completely
agree): contextualism beliefs (from Owe et al., 2013:
four positively worded and three reversed items, e.g.,
“To understand a person well, it is essential to know
about his/her family”), immutability beliefs (Levy,
Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998: three positively worded
and three reversed items, e.g., “People can change even
their most basic qualities”), and community relations
(Eriksson, 2008: three positively worded and three
reversed items, e.g., “I take part in social activities with
the people in my neighbourhood”). Acquiescence was
measured as the within-respondent mean across all 19
items. Extremity was measured as the number of items
coded as 1 or 6. Sample means are provided in the
Appendix.
Portrait-comparison response styles
We used the Human Values Scale, a short form of
the Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz, 2007). Par-
ticipants read short descriptions of 21 target individuals
with gender matched to the participant (e.g., “Thinking
up new ideas and being creative is important to her. She
likes to do things in her own original way”). Participants
rated how similar each person was to themselves, from
1 (very much like me) to 6 (not at all like me), but we
reversed these scores so that higher numbers indicated
greater value endorsement. Schwartz’s circumplex model
covers a comprehensive range of values, each of which
is diametrically opposed with other values within the
scale. This enables the computation of acquiescence as the
within-respondent mean of responses across all 21 items.
Extremity was measured as the number of items coded as
1 or 6. Sample means are provided in the Appendix.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows individual-level means, and individual-
and sample-level correlations between the different indi-
cators of acquiescence, extremity and self-construals.
With Likert-scale response format, acquiescence and
extremity were independent of one another at both
levels of analysis. With portrait-comparison format,
acquiescence and extremity were positively correlated
at both levels of analysis. The likely explanation for
this difference is that while responses to Likert scales
were more normally distributed, those for responses
to portrait-comparison scales were skewed towards the
“like me” scale point (participants checking points 1 and
6, respectively: 17%, 15% for Likert scales; 10%, 20%
for portrait comparisons). All four response style mea-
sures showed substantial sample-level variance (ICCs:
Likert-acquiescence= .254, Likert-extremity= .263;
Portrait-acquiescence= .247, Portrait-extremity= .280).
The hypotheses were tested by multi-level modelling
using HLM6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2007),
with individuals at Level 1 and cultures at Level 2.
Analyses use full maximum likelihood estimation and
robust standard errors. As Table 1 shows that there was
substantial interrelation between some of the different
self-construal measures, especially at the sample level,
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TABLE 1
Means, individual-level and culture-level correlations between response styles and self-construal dimensions
Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Acquiescence/Likert 3.63 (.48) − −.01 .04 .06 −.01 .00 −.03 .03 −.02 −.03 .04
2. Acquiescence/Portrait 4.08 (.72) .11 − .15 .38 .01 .00 .13 −.08 .05 .13 −.01
3. Extremity/Likert 5.38 (4.30) .09 .51 − .53 .04 .02 .08 −.07 .11 .12 −.04
4. Extremity/Portrait 5.79 (4.70) .13 .74 .83 − .06 .04 .14 −.07 .11 .15 −.02
5. Self-expression versus harmony .00 (.37) −.34 −.03 .06 .08 − .44 .89 .61 .38 −.11 −.25
6. Self-direction versus receptiveness to influence .00 (.17) −.42 −.23 −.18 −.33 .62 − .46 .80 −.06 .40 .62
7. Self-difference versus similarity to others .00 (.51) −.53 −.11 −.15 −.17 .59 .50 − .28 .10 .15 .34
8. Self-containment versus connection to others .00 (.29) .04 −.13 .00 −.11 .53 .55 .41 − −.10 −.71 .76
9. Self-consistency versus variability .00 (.40) .05 .62 .34 .50 .24 −.24 .20 −.34 − .48 −.23
10. Self-reliance versus dependence on others .00 (.16) −.27 .36 .10 .25 .23 −.30 .54 −.01 .37 − .14
11. Self-interest versus commitment to others .00 (.50) .57 .38 .34 .38 .54 −.28 −.40 .25 .12 −.32 –
Note: Means are for individual-level scores. Culture-level correlations below the diagonal: correlations >.33, p< .01; individual-level correlations
above the diagonal: correlations >.04, p< .001, but note that the p values may not be trustworthy due to the clustered data structure.
TABLE 2
Individual and culture-level predictors of sample-level acquiescence and extremity
Acquiescence Extremity
Likert scales Portrait-comparison Likert scales Portrait-comparison
Predictors γ γSD t γ γSD t γ γSD t γ γSD t
Individual-level self-construals
Self-expression versus harmony −.009 −.015 −1.21 −.029 −.032 −1.85 .180 .034 1.82 .338 .060 4.12***
Self-direction versus receptiveness to influence −.001 −.003 −0.27 −.025 −.043 −2.65** .070 .021 1.22 .161 .044 3.17**
Difference versus similarity to others −.020 −.037 −3.75*** .050 .062 3.29*** .420 .087 4.51*** .549 .106 8.57***
Self-containment versus connection to others .014 .027 1.85 −.083 −.105 −5.95*** −.368 −.079 −4.23*** −.195 −.039 −3.01**
Self-consistency versus Variability −.009 −.024 −2.32* .017 .031 2.45* .421 .130 8.11*** .370 .106 8.69***
Self-reliance versus dependence on others −.018 −.032 −2.83** .069 .082 5.82*** .637 .127 10.23*** .664 .123 8.60***
Self-interest versus commitment to others .015 .035 2.54** −.014 −.022 −1.25 −.207 −.053 −2.89** −.091 −.022 −1.66
Culture-level models of selfhood:
Self-expression versus harmony −.158 −.373 −3.22** .029 .047 0.44 −.220 −.055 −0.41 −.339 −.072 −0.71
Self-direction versus receptiveness to influence −.393 −.463 −3.35*** −.103 −.083 −0.66 −1.387 −.173 −1.16 −2.563 −.272 2.76**
Difference versus Similarity to Others −.170 −.578 −4.57*** −.004 −.010 −0.09 −.389 −.140 −0.96 −.475 −.146 −1.24
Self-containment versus connection to others .012 .023 0.15 −.059 −.076 −0.63 −.006 −.001 −0.01 −.433 −.074 −0.63
Self-consistency versus Variability .015 .040 0.27 .252 .451 5.10*** 1.264 .350 3.77*** 1.473 .348 4.18***
Self-reliance versus dependence on others −.262 −.275 −1.9 .371 .266 2.85** 1.030 .114 0.77 1.707 .161 1.48
Self-interest versus commitment to others .201 .607 5.86*** .098 .201 2.12* 1.075 .342 2.96** 1.090 .296 2.91**
Note: n= 7122 participants within 55 samples; All analyses included individual-level controls for age and gender; Analyses with acquiescence as
dependent measure included a control for extremity at Level 1; Analyses with extremity as dependent measure included a control for acquiescence at
Level 1; values of γSD were derived as (γ× SDIV) / SDDV, where SDIV is the standard deviation of the predictor and SDDV is the square root of the
individual-level or culture-level variance component of the response style, derived from a null model.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
so that testing all components of each hypothesis con-
currently would risk the effects of multi-collinearity.
Separate models relating each self-construal dimension
to each hypothesis were therefore required, yielding a
total of 28 models. To account for common variance
between the two response styles, effects of each response
style measure were controlled at Level 1 when testing
hypotheses relating to the other. Individual-level effects
of age and gender were also controlled. For greater clar-
ity, the coefficients for these controls are not tabulated
here, but are available from the first author. However,
we note the presence of some significant effects: with
Likert response scales, acquiescence was higher among
older respondents (γ= .002; p< .001), whereas with
“portrait-comparison” response scales, acquiescence
was higher among younger respondents (γ=−.004;
p< .001). Gender was not related to acquiescence. With
extremity as dependent measure, there was no consistent
relationship with age, but male respondents were more
extreme with Likert scales (γ= .509; p< .001) and with
portrait-comparison scales (γ= .583; p< .001) .
Tests of hypotheses regarding acquiescence are
summarised in Table 2. With Likert response scales,
significant individual-level predictors were similarity
with others (supporting H1c), self-interest, dependence
on others and variability. At the cultural level, there
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were significant links with similarity with others (H1c),
harmony (H1a) and receptiveness to influence (H1b),
each of which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. However,
there was again an unpredicted effect for self-interest. At
neither level of analysis, did we find effects of connection
to others (H1d).
With portrait-comparison response scales, there were
significant individual-level effects for receptiveness to
influence (H4b) and connection with others (H4d) as
expected, and further effects for self-consistency and
self-reliance. There was also an effect for difference
from others (contrary to H4c) and no support for har-
mony (H4a). At the cultural level, none of the predicted
effects were found, but there were significant effects for
self-reliance, self-consistency and self-interest.
Table 2 also shows tests of the hypotheses relat-
ing extremity to self-construals. At the individual level,
results were similar for the two different types of response
scale. The same four strong effects were found in both
cases: difference from others (supporting H2c and H5a),
self-consistency (supporting H3 and H5b), self-reliance
(supporting H5c) and connection with others (contrary
to H2d). With Likert scales, the effect for commitment
to others was also significant, but predicted effects of
self-expression and self-direction (H2a,b) were unsup-
ported. With portrait-comparison scales, there were addi-
tional effects for self-expression and self-direction.
At the cultural level, predicted effects for
self-consistency (H3 and H5b), as well as an effect
for self-interest, are found for both types of response
scales. There is also an effect for receptiveness to
influence where portrait-comparison scales were used.
DISCUSSION
We discuss our results in terms of the issues identified
at the beginning of this paper. We first consider how
our findings both illuminate and extend earlier character-
isations of the types of individuals and cultures said to
show greater acquiescence as well as extreme respond-
ing.We conclude by drawing out some implications of our
findings for cross-cultural researchers seeking to avoid,
or at least mitigate, the potential confounding effects of
response styles.
Collectivism and acquiescence
Our findings help to explain previous observations that
acquiescence on Likert scales tends to be higher in more
collectivist cultures (Smith, 2004, 2011). At the cultural
level, we found that acquiescence was higher where pre-
vailing models of selfhood emphasised harmony (H1a),
receptiveness to influence (H1b) and similarity to oth-
ers (H1c), whereas connection to others (H1d) did not
predict acquiescence. At the individual level, participants
who saw themselves as similar to others (H1c) showed
higher acquiescence. Thus, our results concur with those
of Smith and Fischer (2008) in finding effects both in
terms of cultural models of selfhood and of individuals’
self-construals. We add value by identifying the specific
aspects involved at each level. Our results suggest that the
greater acquiescence observed in collectivist cultures may
be due to communication norms, influence processes and
a cultural norm favouring similarity to others, as well as
individuals’ desires for similarity. However, it appears not
to be due to fuzziness of self-other boundaries, as repre-
sented by our measure of self-containment.
Response mode and acquiescence
Acquiescence on the portrait-comparison items showed
little relation with Likert-scale acquiescence at either
level of analysis, and revealed a strikingly different pat-
tern of predictors: Portrait-comparison acquiescence was
higher among individuals scoring higher in connect-
edness to others (H4d) and receptiveness to influence
(H4b), but was not predicted by harmony (H4a) or sim-
ilarity (H4c). Moreover, we found a striking contrast,
whereby individuals who construed themselves as more
self-reliant, more self-consistent and more different from
others were less likely to agree with Likert items, but
more likely to rate the portraits as similar to themselves.
Although perhaps surprising, the latter result is consis-
tent with evidence that those with a higher need for
uniqueness are unwilling to rate themselves as similar
to others, but may have less difficulty in rating others
as similar to themselves (Dang, Xiao, Sun, Lee, & Mao,
2015). Additionally, portrait-comparison acquiescence
was higher among samples emphasizing self-consistency,
self-reliance and self-interest. Thus, there is no evi-
dence that the portrait-comparison format is less prone to
cultural variation in response styles—but clearly the cul-
tural influences involved are very different from those that
apply to traditional Likert scales.
Understanding extreme responding
Results in relation to extremity were more similar for
the two types of response scale. Extreme responding was
correlated at both levels of analysis, and both extremity
measures showed similar patterns of predictors, with
much stronger effects at the individual level than at the
sample level. Thus, certain individuals—and members
of certain cultures—tend to give more (or less) extreme
responses irrespective of item format.
Our findings suggest that more extreme responding in
monumentalist cultures may be due to an emphasis on
self-consistency (supporting the converging predictions
stated as H3 for Likert scales and H5b for portrait com-
parisons). Our predictions that extreme responding for
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portrait comparisons would also be higher when indi-
viduals and cultures emphasised difference (H5a) and
self-reliance (H5c) were supported at the individual level
but not at the cultural level, and we found a converging
pattern for Likert scales.
The results for H2 were more complex. At the culture
level, there were unpredicted effects for commitment to
others for both response formats and for receptiveness
to influence for the portrait-comparison format. At the
individual level, less extreme responding does appear to
be due to individuals’ desire for similarity (H2c). How-
ever, our predictions for harmony (H2a), receptiveness
to influence (H2b) and connectedness to others (H2d)
were unsupported. Furthermore, contrary to H2d, indi-
viduals construing themselves as more connected to oth-
ers showed higher rather than lower extremity in their
responses. Thus, although most of our individual-level
predictions for extremity were unsupported, we did iden-
tify a clear pattern of individual-level predictors, which
differed little between response formats.
Limitations
The design of the study does not control for item con-
tent, so we should consider alternative explanations for
our results. However, contrasting findings for acquies-
cence and for extremity provide some assurance that the
results obtained are not simply due to the differing item
content of the Likert and portrait-comparison scales. If
the results were simply attributable to differences in item
content, the results for extremity should have differed
between response modes just as they did those for acqui-
escence. Additionally, an even larger number of samples
would have allowed us to model effects of the seven self-
hood dimensions together, rather than in separate mod-
els, and thus distinguish their effects more precisely.
Nonetheless, our findings already show some notable
differences across the seven dimensions that could not
have been detected with unidimensional measures of
“collectivism”.
Recommendations for researchers
What are the practical implications of our findings?
Valid comparison of mean scores on survey items
requires measurement equivalence, but response styles
can contribute systematic method variance that will
confound comparisons unless these styles are themselves
an indicator of the attribute being measured. In most
circumstances, it is therefore desirable to measure and
control for response style before comparing means, but
this is especially important across the widely divergent
samples that are characteristic of cross-cultural investiga-
tions. Cross-cultural researchers such as Hofstede (2001)
and Schwartz (2007) have controlled for acquiescence
using procedures for within-subject standardisation, but
others have not. Including reversed items in surveys such
as those tapping Big Five personality dimensions (e.g.,
McCrae, Terracciano, & 79 Members of the Personal-
ity Profiles of Cultures Project, 2005) can reduce the
impact of acquiescence where an adequate number of
items is included. However, simply moving away from
Likert response scales changes the profile of acquiescent
responders rather than eliminating acquiescence. Fur-
thermore, none of the best known cross-national surveys
has taken account of variations in extremity, and we
find that extremity also varies between populations. A
particular implication of our results is that controlling
for acquiescence when using Likert scales does not
control extremity. However, controlling for acquiescence
when using portrait comparisons may be sufficient to
control for extremity, because the two effects are strongly
correlated.
Controlling for both acquiescence and extremity
is therefore necessary when comparing means across
samples. However, separating “method variance” from
“substantive variance” is especially difficult when the
substantive variables are closely associated with par-
ticular response styles. Our fine-grained analysis of the
relationships between models of selfhood and response
styles for different scale formats and on different levels
of analysis may assist future researchers in negotiating
this issue.
Where response styles are thought to be linked to
the substantive constructs under investigation, a remain-
ing problem is that with within-person standardisations,
as well as controlling for external measures of response
style, there is a risk of overcorrecting findings by remov-
ing substantive variance together with the method vari-
ance that is targeted. Where the study design permits, it
may be better to use structural equation models includ-
ing an acquiescence factor in the measurement part of the
model. Crucially, provided that more than one substan-
tive factor is measured with positive and reverse-scored
items on the same response scale, an acquiescence fac-
tor can then be allowed to correlate with the substantive
factors in the model, thus mitigating the risk of over-
correction (Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al., 2003). Adjust-
ing for extremity in structural equation modelling is cur-
rentlymore challenging, butmay become feasible as com-
putational power and software capabilities increase fur-
ther. It remains to be determined how existing under-
standings of culture-level differences will be affected
when acquiescence and extremity are more fully esti-
mated and researchers learn to adjust for them more
effectively.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Demographic details and response style indices for each cultural sample
Age Acquiescence Extremity
Cultural group N Mean SD % Fem Language Likert Portrait Likert Portrait
Belgium high SES 183 43.78 8.17 48 French 3.59 4.14 6.09 5.61
Belgium low SES 175 28.57 9.25 47 French 3.64 4.19 7.41 6.71
Brazil Central 178 33.6 13.77 44 Portuguese 3.53 4.03 6.76 6.10
Brazil North East 150 38.95 11.66 73 Portuguese 3.50 4.12 6.75 7.22
Brazil South 164 25.97 9.67 56 Portuguese 3.48 4.15 5.90 6.78
Cameroon Bafut 100 26.07 6.10 67 English 3.97 4.10 5.70 5.77
Chile Majority 147 44.97 12.46 58 Spanish 3.53 4.39 5.64 6.46
Chile Mapuche 144 38.16 14.83 55 Spanish 3.70 4.36 7.19 8.77
China East 116 31.66 8.27 69 Chinese 3.78 3.81 5.33 3.46
China West 135 31.15 8.70 68 Chinese 3.75 3.83 4.79 3.86
Colombia rural 147 35.23 13.37 62 Spanish 3.66 4.29 5.50 5.67
Colombia urban 144 38.72 11.52 62 Spanish 3.56 4.25 6.09 6.47
Egypt 157 31.12 9.98 52 Arabic 3.57 4.23 7.29 7.81
Ethiopia highlanders 149 33.11 9.23 38 Amharic 3.66 4.52 6.88 8.90
Ethiopia urban 150 35.02 9.00 46 Amharic 3.68 4.45 6.79 9.04
Georgia Baptists 77 44.85 17.27 78 Georgian 3.42 4.13 5.28 8.27
Georgia Orthodox 136 39.16 12.08 46 Georgian 3.58 4.00 6.87 5.01
Germany East 152 40.26 14.73 59 German 3.61 3.89 4.13 3.84
Germany West 102 39.71 15.74 59 German 3.56 3.88 4.42 4.63
Ghana Ashanti 113 28.58 5.09 24 English 3.94 4.08 6.48 7.47
Hungary Majority 151 36.83 12.78 46 Hungarian 3.42 4.05 3.69 4.91
Hungary Roma 90 33.37 11.70 48 Hungarian 3.57 3.86 4.51 5.60
Iceland 119 35.19 13.30 69 Icelandic 3.60 3.96 4.02 4.29
Italy rural 90 40.30 13.69 72 Italian 3.50 3.86 4.73 5.81
Italy urban 81 37.59 12.42 69 Italian 3.49 3.88 4.54 5.40
Japan Hokkaido 70 50.87 12.50 66 Japanese 3.52 3.36 3.01 2.56
Japan Mainland 204 41.43 15.51 61 Japanese 3.50 3.55 3.82 3.02
Lebanon Christians 130 35.45 13.36 54 Arabic 3.55 4.27 7.54 7.99
Lebanon Moslems 120 34.76 14.74 43 Arabic 3.53 4.28 7.96 8.47
Malaysia 150 28.05 7.92 63 Malay 3.93 3.96 3.00 4.68
Namibia Damara 69 25.14 6.40 61 English 3.64 4.30 8.49 9.43
Namibia Owambo 135 24.34 5.30 68 English 3.75 4.37 6.96 7.61
New Zealand Pakeha 202 34.91 13.06 50 English 3.47 3.94 3.94 3.60
Norway 98 37.01 13.54 59 Norwegian 3.42 3.69 5.02 4.01
Oman 159 25.21 4.99 45 Arabic 3.72 4.36 5.56 6.29
Peru rural 68 41.31 13.47 66 Spanish 4.01 3.91 6.93 7.41
Peru urban 76 30.65 14.64 52 Spanish 3.86 4.13 1.72 4.05
Philippines Christian 146 32.01 12.23 52 English/Tausug 3.73 4.24 3.85 4.87
Philippines Muslim 138 24.97 8.82 51 English/Tausug 4.03 4.00 4.90 5.71
Romania rural 162 37.02 15.04 59 Romanian 3.77 4.15 6.40 6.65
Romania urban 318 35.18 12.12 58 Romanian 3.63 4.13 5.69 5.70
Russia Caucasians 128 32.26 11.95 81 Russian 3.72 3.95 6.14 6.45
Russia Russians 121 29.43 12.33 76 Russian 3.49 4.00 3.84 4.07
Singapore 110 34.95 12.74 54 English 3.56 3.90 2.94 3.22
Spain rural 74 38.61 16.14 47 Spanish 3.70 4.28 5.65 7.17
Spain urban 105 41.16 13.39 55 Spanish 3.45 4.07 4.04 4.79
Sweden 101 45.18 16.01 65 Swedish 3.56 3.76 3.78 3.76
Thailand 70 27.99 6.71 69 Thai 3.51 4.40 2.58 4.27
Turkey Alevi 107 38.88 11.02 64 Turkish 3.88 4.12 5.81 6.45
Turkey majority 129 40.62 9.94 58 Turkish 3.71 4.20 4.71 5.57
Uganda Baganda 146 34.43 6.30 59 English 3.92 3.71 3.15 3.07
UK rural 94 51.82 16.15 72 English 3.43 3.81 4.22 4.17
UK urban 133 43.92 17.43 62 English 3.46 3.85 4.02 4.63
US Colorado 90 37.07 14.05 59 English 3.49 3.94 5.30 4.97
US Hispanics 122 27.57 11.08 71 Spanish 3.54 4.39 5.45 6.94
Total 7122 35.27 13.39 57 3.63 4.08 5.38 5.79
SES=Socio-Economic Status.
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